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Reviewing the Current State of Government
Regulation of Investment Advisors
INTRODUCTION
On April 28, 2003, ten of the nation's top investment firms' and
securities regulators finalized a settlement of 1.387 billion dol-
lars.2 The settlement arose out of the failure of these firms and
two individuals3 to provide their clients with "independent and
unbiased" investment research in making decisions to purchase
securities.4 The Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter
"SEC") became concerned in 1999 that with all of the investment
advisors appearing on television, investors did not have sufficient
information to balance the recommendations of investment ana-
lysts against their biases.' An initial examination focused on a
variety of areas of potential conflicts of interest, including
"whether analysts reported to investment banking personnel."'
1. Joint Press Release, SEC, NYAG, NASAA, NASD, and NYSE, Ten of Nation's Top
Investment Firms Settle Enforcement Actions Involving Conflicts of Interest Between Re-
search and Investment Banking-Historic Settlement Requires Payments of Penalties of
$487.5 Million, Disgorgement of $387.5 Million, Payments of $432.5 Million to Fund Inde-
pendent Research, and Payments of $80 Million to Fund Investor Education and Mandates
Sweeping Structural Reforms (April 28, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm. The firms are Bear, Steams & Co. Inc.; Credit
Suisse First Boston LLC; Goldman, Sachs & Co.; Lehman Brothers Inc.; J.P. Morgan Secu-
rities Inc.; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Incorporated; Morgan Stanley & Co.
Incorporated; Citigroup Global Markets Inc. f/k/a Salomon Smith Barney Inc.; UBS War-
burg LLC; and U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray Inc.
2. Id.
3. William H. Donaldson, Chairman, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, Testi-
mony Concerning Global Research Analyst Settlement - Before the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (May 7, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts050703whd.htm. The individuals are Henry M.
Blodget at Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Incorporated and Jack B. Grubman at
Citigroup Global Markets Inc. k/a Salomon Smith Barney Inc. Id. The SEC alleged
among other things that Blodget and Grubman were misleading by issuing research reports
that were contrary to their views expressed in private. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. This examination was conducted by the Division of Market Regulation and the
Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations. Id. The Office of Compliance Inspec-
tions and Examinations will issue deficiency letters when problems are identified but will
refer serious violations over to the Division of Enforcement. The Investor's Advocate: How




The initial examination found areas of potential conflicts of in-
terests in investment research, including a strong tie between
analysts' compensation, investment bankers and the success of
investment banking units.7 As a result, the SEC called on the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers (hereinafter "NASD") and
the New York Stock Exchange (hereinafter "NYSE") to enact new
rules to address these conflicts of interest.8 Investors were in-
formed in 2001 of these conflicts of interests when the SEC issued
an Investor Alert after the findings of conflicts were discovered.9
New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer took the lead in the
fight against the investment companies for recommendations is-
sued by them."0 In 2002, Attorney General Spitzer filed an action
in New York State Court against Merrill Lynch and Company,
Inc., and some of their analysts for publishing ratings on internet
stocks that did not reflect the true opinions of analysts." Attorney
General Spitzer used the Martin Act of 19212 to give him jurisdic-
tion over the securities trading houses." Additionally, it was also
alleged that there was no disclosure of the effect of the analysts'
ties to the investment-banking department of Merrill Lynch.'4
Finally, on April 25, 2002, the SEC commenced a formal inquiry
into "research analysts and the potential conflicts that can arise
from the relationship between research and investment bank-
ing.,,215
The SEC charged the ten firms with various violations; some of
the violations included Section 17(b) of the Securities Act of 1933,
7. Donaldson, supra note 3. The SEC had found in the initial examination conflicts
including that these analysts would provide research on companies that their firm would
underwrite, the analysts compensation would depend on the success of the investment
banking units whose customers would include the same companies who were the subject
the analysts research reports and that investment bankers would be a part of the evalua-
tion of the analyst's compensation. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. Investor Alerts are part of the services offered by the SEC's Office of Investor
Education designed to address questions and problems of investors. Investor Information,
available at http'//www.sec.gov/investor.shtml.
10. Steve Kroft, The Sheriff of Wall Street, 60 Minutes (May 26, 2003), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/05/23/60minutes/main555310.shtml.
11. Donaldson, supra note 3.
12. N.Y. GENERAL BUSINESS LAW §354 (McKinney 2003). This section permits the
Attorney General to petition a justice of the supreme court to issue an order whereby a
witness must appear before the justice and answer questions or bring relevant documents
relating to the fraudulent practices that are at issue. Id.
13. Jack Newfield, The New Crusaders, PARADE, Aug. 3, 2003, at 5.
14. Donaldson, supra note 3.
15. Id. The formal inquiry was launched in order to discover if "laws had been violated
as well as the necessity of additional rulemaking." Id.
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15(c) and 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934," various
NYSE and NASD rules and other state statutes. 7 One of the
firms charged was Merrill Lynch. Merrill Lynch was accused of:
(1) having funded its research department through firm revenues
from other business including investment banking; (2) factoring
the investment banking relationship into the decision to initiate
research coverage; and (3) sharing prospective ratings and re-
search reports with the investment bankers and issuers. 8 Addi-
tionally, the analysts' compensation was based on their contribu-
tions to investment banking. 9 It was also asserted that Merrill
Lynch published research on GoTo, with higher ratings than what
the research analysts were saying behind the scenes, in order to
appease investment banking.2" Merrill Lynch was alleged to have
violated Section 15(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Rulel5cl-2, NSAD Conduct Rules 2110 and NYSE Rules 401, 476,
472.21
The foregoing events raise many issues as to the role of the SEC
and other agencies in the regulation of investment analysts.
While the State of New York, through Attorney General Spitzer,
took the lead in bringing the corruption to the forefront, the ques-
tion of where the appropriate federal government's agencies were
remains.2' The purpose of this comment is to clarify the role of
various agencies, statutes and the courts in the investment world.
This comment will identify the organization and purpose of the
SEC, while evaluating the underlying role of self-regulation in the
investment industry and various court decisions in the field.
I. FEDERAL AGENCIES, STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
The primary purpose of the SEC is to protect investors and to
maintain the integrity of the securities markets by ensuring that
all investors have access to certain basic facts before buying the
16. Government Securities Brokers and Dealers, 15 U.S.C. § 780-5 (2003); National
System for Clearance and Settlement of Securities Transaction, 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1 (2003).
17. Donaldson, supra note 3.
18. Securities and Exchange Commission, Plaintiff v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith Incorporated - Complaint, available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/compl8ll5.htm.
19. Id.
20. Id. Goto, now known as Overture, is an internet search engine company. A deal
was signed in 2003 whereby Overture would be acquired by Yahoo.com.
httpJ/www.content.overture.com/dUsm/about/news/glance.jhtml.
21. Id.
22. Kroft, supra note 10; See also Newfield, supra note 13, at page 5.
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security.23 In addition to requiring public companies to disclose
important information to the public, the SEC oversees other par-
ticipants in the market, including investment advisors.24 After the
stock market crash in October 1929, Congress passed numerous
statutes, including the Securities Act of 193325 (hereinafter "SA")
and the Securities Exchange Act of 193426 (hereinafter "SEA"), to
eliminate certain abuses in the securities industry that had con-
tributed to the crash and the subsequent Depression.27 The com-
mon theme among all of these statutes is the "philosophy of full
disclosure." 8 Just as important, the SEA created the SEC for en-
forcement purposes.2 9
Under its current structure, the SEC has five commissioners
appointed by the President, with the Senate approving the ap-
pointments. 3' The Commissioners are responsible for interpreting
the securities law, amending rules, proposing new rules, and en-
forcing the laws."' Furthermore, the SEC is divided into four main
divisions.32
The first division is the Division of Market Regulation, which is
responsible for regulating the major securities market partici-
pants, including broker-dealers, self-regulatory organizations and
transfer agents.33
The second is the Division of Enforcement, which is responsible
for investigating possible violations of securities laws, recommend-
ing Commission action, and negotiating settlements.34 The SEC
brings 400-500 civil enforcement actions each year against indi-
viduals and companies that break securities laws. 35 All investiga-
tions are private, but if an action is brought, the SEC only has
civil enforcement authority so an action appears only in civil court
or in front of an administrative judge. If criminal charges are
23. The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors and Maintains Market
Integrity, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml.
24. Id.
25. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2000).
26. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2000).
27. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375
U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
28. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. at 186.
29. Securities and Exchange Commission, 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2000).
30. Id.





36. The Investor's Advocate, supra note 23.
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desired, the SEC must work with other criminal law enforcement
agencies to bring a criminal case.37
The third division is the Division of Corporation Finance whose
purpose is to ensure that investors have the material information
needed to make an informed decision.38
The final division is the Division of Investment Management,
which regulates investment companies, federally registered in-
vestment advisers, and public utility holding companies.39 In ad-
dition, the SEC has over 11 regional offices scattered around the
county with a staff of approximately 3,100 people.40 However, the
SEC classifies itself as "small" compared to other federal agen-
cies,41 which leads to the questions of whether the SEC should be
increased in size.
The SEC is empowered to adopt rules in order to protect inves-
tors as securities markets evolve over time because the securities
legislation really operates as a broadly crafted framework.42 The
first step in rule-making involves a "concept release," which issues
to the public and identifies the areas of Commission concern, and
its ideas on dealing with the problem in order to solicit the public's
opinion. 3 Next, a formal rule is drafted and presented to the full
Commission.' After the rule is approved, it is again presented to
the public for its comments.45 The final step in the rule-making
process is for the rule to be presented to the full Commission for
adoption.46 Sometimes, if the rule is very dramatic and sweeping,
Congress may have, within its discretion, the ability to review and
possibly veto it.47
The SEA also created a system of self-regulatory organizations.48
For example, most exchanges must be registered as a national se-
37. Id.
38. Division of Corporation Finance, available at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin.shtml.
39. Division of Investment Management, available at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment.shtml. An example of an investment company is a
mutual fund. Id.





45. The Investor's Advocate, supra note 23.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See e.g. 15 U.S.C. § 78e (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 78f (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2000); and
15 U.S.C. § 78s (2000).
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curities exchange49 pursuant to the section of the SEA dealing
with National Securities Exchanges." These exchanges are regis-
tered once it is determined that the exchange can uniformly en-
force both the federal laws and its own rules.5 The rules of the
exchange must be consistent with the intent of the SEA.52 Fur-
thermore, these exchanges are required to ensure a member is
either a registered broker or dealer or is associated with one.53
Even though these exchanges are self-regulating, the SEC still
has the power to oversee and trump the actions of the exchanges. 4
For example, any new self-regulatory organization rules must be
published for comment before the SEC can give it a final review
and approval."
One of the most important self-regulating organizations is the
National Association of Securities Dealers (hereinafter "NASD").'6
The NASD oversees the activities of securities firms, registered
securities professionals, and the markets operated by the
NASDAQ." Section 15A of the SEA authorizes that "an associa-
tion of brokers and dealers may be registered as a national securi-
ties association."58 The NASD regulates its members through reg-
istration, education, testing and examination of members, and
enforcement of rules. 9 Generally, all members are subject to ex-
amination by the NASD." The NASD also regulates daily trans-
actions on the NASDAQ and other over-the-counter markets. 61
On-site inspections are made of the largest market making and
trading firms to assess compliance.62 Recent NASD statistics re-
veal that the number of customer complaints received and re-
49. Transactions on Unregistered Exchanges, 15 U.S.C. § 78e (2000).
50. National Securities Exchanges, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (2000).
51. See id. at (b)(1).
52. See id.
53. See id. at (c)(1)(a)(b).
54. Registration, Responsibilities, and Oversight of Self-Regulatory Organization, 15
U.S.C. § 78s (2000).
55. See id. at (b)(1), (2).
56. The National Association of Securities Dealers homepage is available at
http://www.nasd.com.
57. NASD Corporate Profile, available at http://www.nasdr.com/2220.asp. The
NASDAQ stands for the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation
System. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1045 (7th Ed. 1999).
58. Registered Securities Associations, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(a) (2000).
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solved has decreased from 6,700 in 1999, to 4,600 in 2002.63 How-
ever, the number of firms and individuals suspended or expelled,
and the number of communications reviewed has increased.6
An examination of the current rules within the NASD Manual
reveals that investment advisors are subject to numerous regula-
tions. First, each member "shall observe high standards of com-
mercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade." 5 When
NASD members make recommendations in sales literature, they
must have a reasonable basis for recommending the security.66
The NASD further prohibits the exclusion of material facts from
sales literature, as well as making outlandish claims of a secu-
rity's potential for success.67 Additionally, sales literature must
disclose that the advice is not a guarantee for a future result. 8 In
sales literature for Collateralized Mortgage Obligations, the mem-
ber may not make a prediction on the yield and average life of the
security without disclosing its dependence on the fluctuation of
interest rates.6  Furthermore, NASD Rules require that each
member base its recommendations to a non-institutional customer
on the customer's specific situation when trying to sell a security.
70
This requirement includes trying to gather information on the
customer's financial status, tax status, investment objectives and
other useful information.7'
II. FEDERAL COURT CASES
The seller of a security is under a strict warranty to ensure that
the statements made with respect to the security have an ade-
quate foundation.72 In Kahn v. Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion,73 the SEC had found that a salesman had made representa-
tions to a customer concerning a security before any financial in-
formation concerning the company's operations were available.74
The SEC argued that the seller had no adequate foundation for
63. NASD Statistics, available at http://www.nasdr.com/2380.asp.
64. Id.
65. NASD Rule 2110.
66. NASD Rule 2210(d)(1), (2).
67. NASD Rule 2210(d)(1)(b).
68. NASD Rule 2210(d)(2)(c).
69. NASD Rule IM-2210-1(a)(6).
70. NASD Rule 2310(a).
71. NASD Rule 2310(b).
72. Kahn v. Sec. and Exch. Comm., 297 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1961).
73. 297 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 1961).
74. Kahn, 297 F.2d at 113.
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the optimism expressed and should have disclosed to his custom-
ers that no financial information was available. 5 In his concur-
ring opinion, Circuit Judge Clark outlined the SEC's 'shingle' the-
ory upon which the SEC had tried to establish statutory fraud:
The essence of this theory is that in certain circumstances one
who sells securities to the public-who hangs out his shin-
gle-implicitly warrants the soundness of statements of stock
value, estimates of a firm's earnings potential, and the like.
When such a person conceals known information inconsistent
with this 'implicit warranty of soundness' he has omitted a
material fact without which the statements made would be
misleading. See 3 Loss, Securities Regulation 1490 (2d Ed.
1961). One element of this warranty, the Commission held
below, is that all such statements, or at least highly optimistic
ones, have an 'adequate basis.' If the salesman makes state-
ments, knowing they had no adequate basis, or if he is
'grossly careless or indifferent to the existence of an adequate
basis' for his statements, then he has violated the antifraud
provisions of the securities law, principally § 17(a)(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2).
76
In Berko v. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n,77 the president of an in-
vestment firm had set up an operation for the sole purpose of sell-
ing a single stock.78 Salesmen were employed to place telephone
calls to customers to move the stock.79 The SEC had made find-
ings that there was a lack of knowledge and a failure to disclose
the financial condition of the company whose stock Berko was at-
tempting to sell to customers. ° The Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit found that the actions of Berko supported the SEC's
finding that the registration of the investment firm should be re-
voked.8 The SEC has the power to revoke the registration of a
broker or dealer if someone under their control violates the Securi-
ties Act.82 Since Berko caused the revocation, another firm could
75. Id. at 113-14.
76. Id. at 114. Circuit Judge Marshall in the Court's opinion remanded the case back
down to the SEC in order to clarify the basis for its findings. Id.
77. 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963).
78. Berko, 316 F.2d at 139.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 142.
81. Id. at 142-43.
82. Id. at 140-41.
120 Vol. 42
Investment Advisors
not employ him in the future. 3 Berko admitted to studying the
literature on the company whose stock he was trying to sell, which
was given to Berko by his employer, and to sending some of it out
to customers.i The court noted that the SEC has within its dis-
cretion to balance the private detriment against the public harm.85
The facts of the case supported the finding that a salesman, espe-
816cially those in a boilerroom operation, may not use as an excuse
for not investigating further the company whose stock they are
trying to sell, the fact that they rely solely on the material pro-
vided to them from their employer broker.87 The Court also found
the fact that some customers were not mislead and may have prof-
ited irrelevant to the SEC's duty to prevent harm in the future.8
Finally, the Court in Hanly v. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n"9 articu-
lated the standard further for those who recommend securities.
Hanley centered on U.S. Sonics Corporation, a company that tried
to raise capital for the production of a ceramic filter.0 The com-
pany remained in the red from its inception in 1958 until 1963,
when it ended up in bankruptcy.91 Employees of a broker-dealer,
Richard J. Buck and Co., made outlandish claims regarding the
potential of success of the Sonics stock.92 For example, there were
claims that the company "would make Xerox look like a standstill"
and that Sonics "had a new invention that would rock the world." 3
The SEC barred the salesmen from further association with any
broker or dealer, concluding that their recommendations were ma-
terially false and misleading based on the making of false state-
ments and failing to disclose.94 The SEC had also found that the
83. Berko, 316 F.2d at 140.
84. Id. at 142.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 139 n.3. A boiler room is "initiated by sales brochures artfully contrived
to avoid express falsehood ... soon followed by telephone solicitations by skilled salesmen
recruited solely for their ability to execute effectively a 'hard sell' campaign. The optimistic
picture present by the brochures is heightened by oral projections of specific per share
earnings, predictions of market price rises and other happy prospect wholly lacking an
adequate basis. At no time is disclosure made of any known or reasonable ascertainable
adverse information." Id.
87. Id. at 142-43.
88. Berko, 316 F.2d at 143.
89. 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1969).
90. Hanley, 415 F.2d at 592-93.
91. Id. at 593.
92. Id. at 593.
93. Id. at 593-95.
94. Id. at 595. The SEC found that the salesmen had willfully violated Section 17(a) of
the SE act, 10(b) and 15(c)(1) of the SEA. Id. at 592.
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sophistication of the purchaser as well as the absence of a boiler
room scenario had no effect on the duty of the salesman."
The court, on appeal, noted that "brokers and salesmen are un-
der a duty to investigate, and their violation of that duty brings
them within the term 'willful' in the Exchange Act."96 In other
words, the brokers and salesmen must analyze, and they do not
have the luxury of pleading ignorance when facts are discoverable
through investigation.97 Even if the purchaser does not rely on the
statement, damages may still be imposed because reliance is not
an element of fraudulent misrepresentation under these circum-
stances.98 The court went on to note that when the proceedings
are private and equitable relief is sought, the standard is modified
to allow for broader protection of the public.99 Furthermore, the
court notes "a securities dealer occupies a special relationship to a
buyer of securities in that by his position he implicitly represents
he has an adequate basis for the opinions he renders."'00 The strict
standard, by which the salesmen were judged, led the court to af-
firm the earlier findings of the SEC.101
However, when the action is civil in nature, the investor cannot
rely on this heightened implied warranty discussed in Hanley.'2
The SEC was permitted in Hanley to bar the salesman from the
industry in the future under 15 U.S.C. § 78(b)(7).10 3 The state-
ments made by the brokers and salesmen in Hanley can be con-
trasted with statements in Zerman v. Ball.1'4  In Zerman, the
plaintiff attempted to bring an action on statements such as de-
fendant E.F. Hutton's slogan that "When E.F. Hutton Talks, Peo-
ple Listen," and the statement by the defendant salesmen that the
bonds the plaintiff eventually purchased were "marvelous."' ' The
court quickly dismissed any private claim for securities violations
on these statements by holding that they "do not constitute repre-
95. Hanley, 415 F.2d at 595.
96. Id. at 595-96.
97. Id. at 596.
98. Id.
99. Id. There is no requirement of proof of specific intent in an enforcement proceeding
for equitable relief. Id.
100. Hanley, 415 F.2d at 596.
101. Id. at 597.
102. Id. at 596-97.
103. Id. at 598.
104. 735 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1984).
105. Zerman, 735 F.2d at 20-21.
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sentations of fact that could be actionable under the securities
laws.
, 10 6
Under Rule 10b-5 of the SEA, a broker is prohibited from
"churning" a customer. '°7 "Churning occurs when a broker, exer-
cising control over the volume and frequency of trades, abuses the
broker's customer's confidence for personal gain by initiating
transactions that are excessive in view of the character of the ac-
count and the customer's objectives as expressed to the broker."18
In Nesbit v. McNeil,"9 one of the plaintiffs assets increased in
value due to the defendant's actions. However, the defendants
liquidated some of the investments and made approximately one
thousand trades with an overall transaction value of 4.4 million
dollars and a commission of $250,000, even though the widow had
stressed that her objectives were stability, income, and growth.'1 o
On appeal, the Court examined whether the plaintiffs could re-
cover for "churning" even when the defendants had increased the
portfolio value to where it exceeded the amount of commissions
they charged.'
A case for "churning" is established in light of the whole history
of an account and with expert testimony.11 2 The specific elements
are "(1) that the trading in [the] account was excessive in light of
[the customer's] investment objective; (2) that the broker in ques-
tion exercised control over the trading in the account; and (3) that
the broker acted with the intent to defraud or with the willful and
reckless disregard for the interest of [the] client.""1 The second
element is met even if the account is not a discretionary account."
4
It is essential that expert testimony prove these elements."'
The facts of Nesbit illustrate the establishment of churning be-
cause the relationships between the parties demonstrated that the
widow was unsophisticated on these matters, that the adviser had
control, that the requisite intent was present, as demonstrated by
the apology to the plaintiffs, and that the advisor had made exces-
106. Id. at 21.
107. Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240. 10b-5 (2003).
108. FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, § 162.250 (2003)
109. 896 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1990).
110. Nesbit, 896 F.2d at 381.
111. Id. at 382.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 382-83.
114. Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc., 619 F.2d 814, 821 (9th Cir. 1980).
115. Mihara, 619 F.2d at 819.
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sive trades."6 Since churning is a "unified offense," an analysis of
the entire history of the management and pattern of trading must
be made in order to establish churning." As a result, any poten-
tial for the statute of limitations to act as a bar in bringing the
suit is triggered only when the plaintiff had actual or inquiry no-
tice that a fraudulent misrepresentation had been made."' After
finding sufficient evidence that the plaintiffs had made out a
prima facie case for the jury, the court discussed the two types of
damages that could be awarded for a churning violation."9 The
first type of award of damages would be based on any commissions
paid in excess of commissions that would have been reasonable on
transactions during the time period, if the client's interest were
followed, and the second type was for a decline in portfolio value. 2'
Due to the existence of two separate types of damages, the plain-
tiffs could recover damages for the excess commissions in spite of
the increase in their portfolio value. 2'
"Scalping" is another conduct prohibited under the Investment
Advisers Act of 194022 Among other things, this Act prohibits an
investment adviser from defrauding the client, engaging in any
transaction which operates as a fraud or deceit upon the client,
and selling or buying, with knowledge, any security to or from a
client for the adviser's own account without full disclosure.'23 In
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc.,'24 the respondents were engaged in purchasing secu-
rities before recommending the securities in their published re-
ports for long-term investment.' After an increase in the market
price and volume, the respondents would then sell the security.
2 6
The SEC attempted to obtain an injunction against the practices
of the company."' The lower court found, and the appellate courtagreed, that the SEC had to actually prove that there had been a
116. Nesbit, 896 F.2d at 383.
117. Id. at 384.
118. Id. at 384-85.
119. Id. at 385.
120. Id. at 385.
121. Nesbit, 896 F.3d at 385-86.
122. Prohibited Transactions by Inv. Advisers, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2000).
123. Id.
124. Sec. and Exch. Comm. v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
125. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. at 182-83.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 183.
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fraud or deceit in specific ways, such as intent to injure clients or
actual misstatements in the reports.
28
At issue on allocatur was whether the Investment Advisors Act
of 1940 required an investment advisor to disclose this activity to
a client.'29 Upon reviewing both the history and purpose of the
Investment Advisors Act of 1940, the Supreme Court found that
Congress intended the statute to be interpreted broadly enough to
include nondisclosure of material facts.'
30
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 thus reflects a congres-
sional recognition 'of the delicate fiduciary nature of an in-
vestment advisory relationship,' as well as a congressional in-
tent to eliminate, or at least to expose, all conflicts of interest
which might incline as investment adviser--consciously or un-
consciously--to render advice which was not disinterested." 3'
This relaxed definition of fraud is consistent with common law
fraud, which varied with the nature of the relief sought, the rela-
tionship between the parties, and the merchandise in issue. 32 The
requirement of intent is not necessary when equitable relief is
sought, as in this case, or when the suit is against a fiduciary.33
Thus, disclosure is required so that the investor knows if the advi-
sor is serving two masters. 1 Accordingly, an investment advisor
may be required under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 "to
make full and frank disclosure of his practice of trading on the
effect of his recommendations."'35
The argument that no specific requirement of disclosure of ma-
terial facts was required by Congress in the Investment Advisors
Act of 1940 was put to rest when the Supreme Court found that,
considering the history and chronological enactment of securities
regulation, the omission of a specific requirement was not impor-
tant.136 Furthermore, subsequent cases have found that nondisclo-
sure is one type of fraud or deceit.3 7 It also did not matter that
the actual advice given was "honest" because failure to disclose
128. Id. at 184-85.
129. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. at 181.
130. Id. at 191-92.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 194.
133. Id. at 194-95.
134. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. at 196.
135. Id. at 197.
136. Id. at 197-98.
137. Id. at 198.
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information invites fraud.'38 The danger of "predatory practices"
exists when information is suppressed.9 Damages available for
unsuitable recommendations are the difference between the pur-
chase price and the sales price."' Sometimes, it might be neces-
sary to offset the recoverable damages by an amount that would
reflect the changes in the market, such as cases involving fraudu-
lent mismanagement due to the fact that even a properly managed
security could suffer a loss.'
4'
Investors cannot solely rely on the forgoing rules. An investor
cannot recover for a bad investment based on an advisor's mis-
statements or omission unless they are able to show that the in-
vestor was justified in relying on the advisor's statements. For
example, in Banca Cremi, a bank purchased collateralized mort-
gage obligations on the recommendations of a firm and its em-
ployee.' After losing money, the bank brought suit alleging that
both 10(b) and 10b-5 were violated since there were misrepresen-
tations, unsuitable securities sold, and a failure to disclose exces-
sive markups.14  On appeal, the Court found "[a] dissatisfied in-
vestor cannot recover for a poor investment on the basis of a bro-
ker's alleged omission or misstatement where, 'through minimal
diligence, the investor should have discovered the truth.'"4 5  The
factors used to determine whether an investor is justified in rely-
ing on a material omission or misstatement were:
(1) the sophistication and expertise of the plaintiff in financial
and securities matters; (2) the existence of long standing
business or personal relationships; (3) access to relevant in-
formation; (4) the existence of a fiduciary relationship; (5)
concealment of the fraud; (6) the opportunity to detect the
fraud; (7) whether the plaintiff initiated the stock transaction
or sought to expedite the transaction; and (8) the generality or
specificity of the misrepresentations. 6
138. Id. at 200.
139. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. at 200.
140. Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 600 (2d Cir. 1978).
141. Clark, 583 F.2d at 603-04.
142. Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017, 1027-28 (4th Cir.
1997).
143. Banca Cremi, S.A., 132 F.3d at 1021.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1027-28 (quoting Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1032 (2d
Cir. 1993).
146. Id. at 1028 (citations omitted).
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The Court found that the Bank qualified as a sophisticated in-
vestor under both the foregoing standard and under the NASD
standards. "7 The Court went on to find that the claim under 10(b)
failed for the same reason. 8 An unsuitability claim under 10(b)
has five elements:
(1) that the securities purchased were unsuited to the buyer's
needs; (2) that the defendant knew or reasonably believed the
securities were unsuited to the buyer's needs; (3) that the de-
fendant recommended or purchased the unsuitable securities
for the buyer anyway; (4) that, with scienter, the defendant
made material misrepresentations (or, owing a duty to the
buyer, failed to disclose material information) relating to the
suitability of the securities; and 5) that the buyer justifiably
relied to its detriment on the defendant's fraudulent con-
duct. 
9
After an adviser accepts an order from a client, the advisor
comes under a duty of "best execution."5 ° In Newton v. Merrill,
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,"' the plaintiffs filed an action
against the defendant market makers who sold their securities on
the NASDAQ using the National Best Bid and Offer System (here-
inafter "NBBO")."12 The securities were sold using the NBBO de-
spite better offers available on other on-line systems.13 Both par-
ties on appeal had agreed that:
[A] broker-dealer, by accepting an order without price instruc-
tions, impliedly represents that the order will be executed in a
manner consistent with the duty of best execution and that a
broker-dealer who accepts such an order while intending to
147. Id. at 1029, 1031.
148. Banca Cremi, S.A., 132 F.3d at 1032.
149. Id. quoting Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1993)
(emphasis added).
150. Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266 (3d Cir.
1998).
151. 135 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 1998).
152. Newton, 135 F.3d at 268-69. "All NASDAQ market makers are required to input
their bid and offer prices to the NASD computer, which collects the information and trans-
mits, for each security, the highest bid price and lowest ask price currently available. These




breach that duty makes a misrepresentation that is material
to the purchase or sale.' 54
The duty of best execution has it foundation in agency princi-
pals because "the client-principal seeks his own economic gain and
the purpose of the agency is to help the client-principal achieve
that objective, the broker-dealer, absent instructions to the con-
trary, is expected to use reasonable efforts to maximize the eco-
nomic benefit to the client in each transaction."155 Furthermore,
the NASD's Rules of Fair Practice, adopted in 1968, required bro-
kers in the over-the-counter market to "use reasonable diligence to
ascertain the best inter-dealer market for the subject security and
buy or sell in such market so that the resultant price to the cus-
tomer is as favorable as possible under the prevailing market con-
ditions."156 Thus, the duty of best execution led the Court to re-
verse summary judgment by finding that technology had devel-
oped enough to where there was a better price that could have
been obtained elsewhere.'57
Companies may not solicit and sell securities at prices ex-
tremely beyond the current market price without disclosure."5 "It
is fraud to exact such profits through the purchase or sale of secu-
rities while the representation on which the relationship is based
is knowingly false."'5 9 The only way to avoid the finding of fraud is
to charge a price that is in reasonable relation to the market price
or to disclose the information to the purchaser.6 '
For example, in Charles Hughes & Co., v. Securities and Ex-
change Commission,' the company was engaged in over-the-
counter trades of securities and was selling them at prices well
above the prevailing over the counter market rate, which resulted
in the company's broker and dealer registration to be revoked.'62
Some of the prices were from 16 to 40 percent over the market
154. Id. at 269.
155. Id. at 270.
156. Id. at 271 (quotations omitted).
157. Newton, 135 F.3d at 272. The trial court had found there was no misrepresentation
made to the plaintiffs because the duty of best execution was so poorly defined that as a
matter of law, executing a trade on the NBBO was not inconsistent with this duty. Id. at
269.
158. Charles Hughes & Co., v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 139 F.2d 434, 437
(2d Cir. 1943).
159. In the Matter of Trost & Co., 12 S.E.C. 531, 535 (1942).
160. Trost & Co., 12 S.E.C. at 535.
161. 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943).
162. Charles Hughes & Co., 139 F.2d at 435.
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value,'63 and at no time did the company reveal the true market
price to the customer.' 6 Most of the customers had been single
women or widows who were pursued as customers through consis-
tent phone calls.' The Commission found this constituted fraud
and deceit in violation of SA 17(a), SEA 15(c)(1) and Rule X-15C1-
2.166 The Commission, as a result, revoked the firm's broker and
dealer registrations. 67 In particular, the court held that SA 17(a)
was violated by making a false material statement, failing to state
a material fact to prevent customers from being mislead, and op-
erating the business in such a way that it constituted a fraud.6 s
On appeal, the court found that the firm committed fraud in
that it held itself out as "competent to advise in the premises, and
it should disclose the market price if sales are to be made substan-
tially above that level." 69 By holding itself out as an expert, the
company was under a duty not to take advantage of the ignorance
of its customers. 7 ° The failure to disclose the true market price
and the company's profits from the markup, were held to be a fail-
ure to state a material fact and the use of a fraudulent device.
17
The courts have realized that "[t]he business of trading in securi-
ties is one in which opportunities for dishonesty are of constant
recurrence and ever present.' 7 2 Under 17(a) of the Securities Act,
the SEC has consistently held that a dealer must disclose to the
client the fact that it is charging prices that are not reasonably
related to the prevailing market price.' 73 Afterall, the objective of
the securities laws "is to protect those who do know market condi-
tions from the overreaching of those who do. "17' Reasonableness,
in relation to markups, is defined by looking at the type of security
involved, its availability in the market, market price, amount of
money involved in a transaction, disclosure, a pattern of markups
163. Id. at 436.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 435-36.
166. Id. at 434-35.
167. Charles Hughes & Co., Inc., 139 F.2d at 435.
168. Id. at 436.
169. Id. at 436-37.
170. Id. at 437.
171. Id.





or markdowns, and the nature of the member's business. "5 The
NASD has advised that a five-percent markup is reasonable,'76 but
the NASD states that five-percent is just a guide and not a rule.'77
The NASD holds that fairness also depends on the number of fac-
tors previously outlined. ' Damages for excessive markups of se-
curities are measured as the total amount of the excessive
markup.'79 In addition, the Third and Sixth Circuits have recog-
nized a private cause of action for the failure to disclose excessive
markups under the SEA.18
In addition to the duty to investigate, an investment advisor is
under a duty to know its customer.' In Mihara v. Dean Witter &
Co. Inc.,82 the plaintiff had filed a suit alleging the defendants
engaged in churning actions by purchasing unsuitable securities,
which were not consistent with his investment objectives.183 The
plaintiff had engaged in trading for over ten years before employ-
ing the defendants." When the plaintiff hired the defendants,
speculative investments were made in which the plaintiff had re-
lied on the recommendations of the defendants.'85 The plaintiff
had complained about the heavy losses he sustained over a two-
year period of time.' The NYSE requires account executives to
learn all essential facts about their clients.'87 Specifically, Rule
405 of the NYSE holds:
Every member organization is required through a general
partner, a principal executive officer or a person or persons
designated under the provisions of Rule 342(b)(1) to (1) Use
due diligence to learn the essential facts relative to every cus-
tomer, every order, every cash or margin account accepted or
175. Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017, 1033 (4th Cir. 1997),
quoting 3C Harold S. Bloomenthal, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATION LAW, App.
12.13 (Apr. 1, 1992).
176. NASD Rule IM-2440
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, at 600 n. 6.
180. Ettinger v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 835 F.2d 1031, 1033 (3d
Cir.1987); See also Bank of Lexington & Trust Co. v. Vining- Sparks Sec. Inc., 959 F.2d 606,
614 (6th Cir.1992).
181. Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc., 619 F.2d 814, 819, 825 (9th Cir. 1980).
182. Mihara, 619 F.2d at 814.
183. Id. at 817.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 818.
187. Mihara, 619 F.2d at 819.
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carried by such organization and every person holding power
of attorney over any account accepted or carried by such or-
ganization.'8
All brokers using the NYSE must hold to this standard or else
they can be liable for fraud. 89 Additionally, NYSE Rule 405 allows
a private cause of action. Furthermore, Article 3, §1 of the
NASD Rules of Fair Practice requires "supervisory personnel to
make sure that account executives are dealing fairly and within
the objectives of their clients and to know the client."9 ' Moreover,
excessive trading is to be judged in the light of the investment ob-
jective of the customer.92 Some NASD Rules have created a pri-
vate cause of action if the violations are tantamount to fraud.
9 3
In Clark, a retired schoolteacher worked with a president of a
corporation, in the business of buying and selling securities, in
order to formulate an investment plan to yield to her $1000.00 a
month. 1 94 A jury found that the president and the company en-
gaged in purchasing securities unsuitable for her needs; that she
relied on his advice for the purchased securities; and that he failed
to inform her of the unreasonableness of her expectations, the
risks involved in the securities she purchased, and he had the in-
tent of purchasing the securities so that he could charge her an
excessive price.9 The president's behavior led the jury to find him
liable for statutory fraud.9 '
On appeal, it was argued that the NASD rules do not create a
private cause of action.9 ' Since the court upheld the lower court's
finding of a violation under the securities laws, it did not rule on
the issue of a private cause of action, although it noted that lower
court opinions do recognize private causes of action under certain
NASD rules.9 It further found held that in order for a plaintiff to
recover under a private cause of action based on Rule 10b-5, the
188. Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 678 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1980) (quoting NYSE
Rule 405).
189. Mihara, 619 F.2d at 824 (citing Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillan, 424 F.Supp.1021,
1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd at 570 F.2d 38 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978)).
190. Id. at 819.
191. Id.
192. Id. at821.
193. Clark, 583 F.2d at 599 n. 5.
194. Clark, 583 F.2d at 597.
195. Id. at 597-98.
196. Id. at 599.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 599 n.5.
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plaintiff had to show that the rule had been violated, and that it
was violated with an intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud.199
In Spicer v. Chicago Board of Options Exch., Inc. 200 the plain-
tiffs argued that under Section 6(b) of the SEA, they had a private
cause of action against market-makers and the Chicago Board of
Options Exchange (hereinafter "CBOE").2 °' A day after the stock
market crash in 1987, the plaintiffs had issued orders to their
brokers to purchase options at the prevailing market price, but the
market-makers sold them the securities at an inflated price.2 2
Market-making occurs when a broker-dealer "buys and sells se-
curities as a principal for its own account, and thus accepts two-
way bids." 2°3 The plaintiffs alleged that the CBOE facilitated the
action by failing to enforce their own rules"4 and that the market-
makers violated 6(b) by failing to comply with the exchange
rules.2"' The lower court dismissed the case by holding that 6(b)
did not create a private cause of action.2 6
On appeal, the Circuit Court noted that implied private rights of
action are complicated because of concern in recognizing causes of
action for which Congress had no intention of creating balanced
against the court's role in interpreting statutes for determining
Congress's underlying intent.2 7  The Appellate Court noted the
lack of clear guidance from the Supreme Court on private causes
of action .2  The Appellate Court found that courts should look
towards determining whether Congress intended to create a pri-
vate remedy by reading the language and structure of the statute,
examining circumstances surrounding its enactment, examining
legislative history, and looking to the contemporary legal context
in which Congress enacted the statute.2 9 However, courts cannot
recognize an implied remedy if there is no evidence Congress in-
tended to create one.2 1 0
In examining 6(b), the Spicer Court found that based on the
language of 6(b) alone, there was no private right of action for the
199. Clark, 583 F.2d at 600.
200. 977 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1992).
201. Spicer, 977 F.2d at 256 (7th Cir. 1992).
202. Id. at 256-57.
203. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 984 (7th ed. 1999).
204. Spicer, 977 F.2d at 257.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 257-58.
208. Id. at 258.




failure of an exchange to enforce its rules.2 1' The legislative his-
tory was also absent of any mention of a private remedy.212 Fur-
thermore, the Court found that 6(b) exclusively dealt with the pre-
requisites of registration and the steps for the SEC to grant regis-
tration.2" However, the Court examined 19(g)(1) of the SEA,
which holds "every self-regulatory organization shall comply with
the provisions of this Act, the rules and regulations thereunder,
and its own rules . . ." and found that it imposes a duty on the
exchange to comply with its own rules although no probable pri-
vate cause of action exists."'
Additionally, in Thompson v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham and
Co., Inc.215, the plaintiff alleged that the brokerage firm and its
employee failed to disclose to him the risks of option trading under
10b-5 as well as churned his account.216 There was never any dis-
cussion between the two parties regarding the Plaintiff's financial
recourses or previous stock experience. 217 The appellate court af-
firmed the trial court's finding that there was no churning,2"8 be-
cause excessiveness depends on the structure and investment ob-
jective of the account, and there was no excessive trading due to
the plaintiffs character as a player of the market who was aware
that the investments being made were not conservative. 21 9 The
Appellate Court further affirmed the trial court's finding that
there was no violation of 10b-5 since the plaintiff knew of the
risks, or should have known of the risks, of option trading.22 ° Fi-
nally, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that no private cause of
action exists for violating the "know your customer" rule or the
NASD suitability rule.22'
In Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec. Inc. ,222 the Third Circuit
considered whether a private cause of action existed under 10(b) of
the SEA or Rule 10b-16 of the SEA.223 Rule 10b-16 provides in
211. Id. at 259.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 259-60.
214. Spicer, 977 F.2d at 260. The plaintiffs did not rely very heavily on 19(g)(1), instead
choosing to focus on 6(b). Id.
215. 709 F.2d 1413 (11th Cir. 1983).
216. Thompson, 709 F.2d at 1414-15.
217. Id. at 1415.
218. Id. at 1416.
219. Id. at 1417.
220. Id. at 1418.
221. Thompson, 709 F.2d at 1419.
222. 764 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1985).
223. Angelstro, 764 F.2d at 941.
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part that "it shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer to extend
credit, directly or indirectly, to any customer in connection with
any securities transactions" unless the broker communicates to
the client certain relevant information relating to the interest
charges.224 The Court found that in interpreting whether a rule
creates a private cause of action, it must figure out if "the statute
under which the rule was promulgated properly permits the impli-
cation of a private right of action [and] whether a private right of
action should be implied from the agency rule at issue."225 The
Court noted that other courts have found an implied private cause
of action under 10(b),22 ' and that the rule was within the scope of
authority of the SEC. 27 Further, a private cause of action was
found to advance the goals of 10(b).228
In Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co.,229 the plaintiff alleged that Dean
Witter violated NYSE Rule 405 and the NASD suitability rules.23 °
The district court had found that there was no implied cause of
action under these rules.231' The plaintiff alleged that she opened
the account without the account salesmen inquiring into her fi-
nancial position.232 In addition, the salesmen allegedly recommend
highly speculative securities but never told her that she could
close her account.233 The appellate court noted the Supreme Court
had previously held that no private cause of action exists under
17(a) of the SEA because the fact that a federal statute was vio-
lated did not automatically create a private cause of action for
damages.234
A private cause of action can only be determined by finding out
if Congress intended a cause of action to exist.23' The test for ex-
change rules was to be "(1) whether Congress intended to delegate
authority to establish rules implying a private right of action;
[and] (2) whether the stock exchange rules were drafted such that
a private action may legitimately be implied."236 The Ninth Circuit
224. Id. at 942 n.ll.
225. Id. at 947.
226. Id. at 948.
227. Id. at 948-49.
228. Angelstro, 764 F.2d at 949-50.
229. 614 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1980).
230. Jablon, 614 F.2d at 678.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 678-79.
234. Id. at 679 (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979)).




noted that the SEA did not expressly provide a private cause of
action for violations of stock exchange rules and NASD rules,
2 37
and the Supreme Court had previously rejected a private cause of
action under sections 17(a) and 27 of the SEA.23s As a result, the
Ninth Circuit rejected the notion that an implied private cause of
action existed under 6(b).239
III. CONCLUSION
In spite of the excessive regulation under which investment ad-
visors operate, it is shocking to find that Merrill Lynch and other
firms still engaged in the behavior that they did. By the time a
settlement was reached with the firms, questions were still being
asked as to why the SEC was not involved sooner. In the end, the
final settlement that was reached with the investment firms was
divided into monetary relief, structural reform, enhanced disclo-
sures, independent research, investor education, voluntary initia-
tive regarding initial public offerings and individual settlements.24 °
Some of the monetary relief went into recompensating investors
harmed.24'
In addition, reforms were instituted to isolate research analysts
from investment banking pressure.14' For example, analysts' com-
pensation can no longer be based upon or influenced by invest-
ment banking.2 3 The firms are now required to disclose to inves-
tors that they do, or seek to do, business with companies covered
in the research of its analysts. 24 Furthermore, firms are required
to purchase some form of independent, third-party research for
their customers.245 Moreover, a fund would be setup to help educa-
tion individual investors attain knowledge to make more informed
investment decisions.2 6 Allocations of securities in "hot" IPOS for
certain company executive officers and directors were restricted.247
Finally, individual settlements were reached with Merrill Lynch
237. Id. at 680-81.
238. Id. at 680.
239. Id.











analyst, Henry M. Blodget, and SSB analyst, Jack B. Gruban, for
monetary penalties as well as imposing a permanent bar on their
association with any broker, dealer, or investment advisor.248
Additional problems still remain in this industry and the regu-
lating government agencies. In a recent interview with Attorney
General Spitzer, it was noted that a bill before Congress would
prohibit state officials from taking action in cases such as the one
Attorney General Spitzer faced. Furthermore, Senator Richard
Shelby of Alabama recently noted that Spitzer needed to bring
criminal prosecutions against these executives in order to really
effectuate change in the culture and to deter this from happening
in the future.
One possible action that should be taken is the empowerment of
the SEC with more staff and the resulting ability to initiate these
criminal actions themselves. Merrill Lynch CEO Stan O'Neal has
even said, "To teach investors that ... if they lose money in the
market they're automatically entitled to be compensated for it
does both them and the economy a disservice."249 Clearly, the cul-
ture on Wall Street remains a problem because investment advi-
sors fail to recognize that they are held to a high standard of fair
conduct that has developed over the years by the SEC and the
court system. If Wall Street chooses to follow the rules created by
the SEC, the law would not award an investor just because they
lost money. The rules were already in place to prevent this situa-
tion from happening, but the agencies needed to be more empow-
ered to act against firms such as Merrill Lynch.
Susan Heinemann
248. Id. Henry Blodget, for example, had been publicly touting a stock called Lifemind-
ers while privately calling the stock a "P-O-S" which stood for piece-of-..."; See also Kroft,
supra note 10.
249. Newfield, supra note 13, at 6.
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